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Abstract 
In this work the concept of process safety is incorporated in plant layout configuration of an ammonia plant.  Four critical process 
units namely, primary reformer, secondary reformer, high temperature shift converter and ammonia converter were selected as 
the sources of overpressure and toxic release. Locations of four facilities including control room, two operator’s shelters and 
ammonia accumulator were considered for layout optimization with respect to the critical units.  The consequences due to toxic 
release and blast overpressure were modeled for various worst case scenarios of the critical units. Both structural damage and 
human mortality/injury were converted into economic term using suitable probability functions, frequency, and cost parameters 
related to property damage and compensation of fatalities. Finally optimization problem was solved using mixed integer linear 
programming in order to find the optimum locations of different facilities within the process plant. 
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1. Introduction 
Designing of process plants is a complex and demanding task. Configuring process layout is an essential part of 
plant design and one of the most important tasks before plant construction.Traditionally, the layout focuses on the 
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most economical spatial allocation of process units and facilities with respect to their inter connectivity i.e. the 
piping cost. In past, heuristics and graph methods [1-3] were used for facility layout which only considered best use 
of the available plant area. The current methodologies also incorporate risk and economic factors in configuring 
facility layout [4-7]. 
The two major accidents in the history of chemical process industries in Bangladesh took place in a fertilizer 
factory, namely, Urea Fertilizer Factory Limited (UFFL) in 1974 and 1991. Both accidents affected control room 
occupants that led to increased number of fatalities along with property damage and were related to layout problem. 
In present work we look for an optimum layout of different facilities in an ammonia plant considering both safety 
and economics. Here, the safety was incorporated with plant economics by converting the risks of explosion and 
toxic release into cost parameters in terms of structural damage and death compensation. These cost parameters were 
then weighed against the piping and wiring costs to find optimum location for different facilities.  
2. Optimization Methodology 
In this work Jung et al.’s [3] grid based method was used to determine the arrangement of different facilities 
within the processing area of an ammonia plant. The existing layout of Karnaphuli Fertilizer Company Ltd 
(KAFCO) at Rangadia, Karnaphuli, Chittagong-4000, Bangladesh, was adopted for this purpose. The following 
steps were carried out to optimize the layout of different facilities within the processing area 
At first, the entire processing area was discretized into a number of grids of fixed size. It was assumed that each 
unit and facility is located within these grids. Next, the most critical units of ammonia plant were identified based on 
operating temperature, pressure, and possible consequences.Four important facilities were also selected for layout 
optimization with respect to the critical units. The risks associated in each grid were calculated using the 
consequence analysis of each process critical unit. Blast overpressure due to vapor cloud explosion (VCE) and toxic 
release consequences were consideredfor calculating the associated risks. These risk values were converted into 
Risk Score using suitable probability functions.   
Finally, considering the economic parameters for facility installation and maintenance cost, a mathematical 
formulation of total cost is developed. This mathematical formulation was optimized against different constraints in 
order to find the suitable location of the four selected facilities in theammonia process plant. 
2.1 Discretization of process area and selection of critical units and facilities 
The total processing area of KAFCO ammonia plant is 13,038 m2 (123m×106m). For convenience, 10,000m2 
processing area consisting one hundred (10m×10m) square grids were considered in this work. Four critical process 
units namely, Primary Reformer, Secondary Reformer, Ammonia Converter and High Temperature Shift converter 
were selected as the sources of fire/explosion and toxic release based on operating pressures, temperatures and 
hazardous consequences. The assigned grid locations of critical process units within the processing area are shown 
in figure 10. The location of each unit within grids corresponds to the location in the actual process plant in 
KAFCO. Four facilities, namely, control room, two operator shelters, and ammonia accumulator were selected for 
optimum layout determination.  
2.2 Risk Mapping 
Two different Risk Scores were used for risk mapping in discretized process area; 
1. Risk Score due to toxic gas release 
2. Risk Score due to VCE 
The concentration profile of toxic gas for each grid was determined withfree software ALOHA considering the 
worst case scenario,. These concentration values were converted to probability of death using following probit 
function[46]: 
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         (1) 
Where, Pr = Probability of death due to toxic ammonia release; C = Concentration of released ammonia in ppm 
and t = Exposure time (min). 
ALOHA uses Gaussian model which give time average result and in this simulation, 60 minutes exposure time 
was considered for consequence determination.Similarly, considering the worst case scenarios, the overpressure 
profile due to vapor cloud explosion was calculated using ALOHA. The overpressure profiles were converted to 
probability of structural damage using the following probit function[8, 9]: 
         (2) 
Where, Pr = Probability of Structural damage due to VCE and P = Overpressure value in N/m2. Finally, the Risk 
Score values due to toxic release as well as vapor cloud explosion were calculated using following equation: 
 
  (3) 
 
2.3 Optimization Objective Function 
The objective of this study is to determine the arrangement of different facilities within the processing area that 
minimizes the total cost, which include both initial investment cost and operation and maintenance cost. The 
objective function can be written in following manner: 
            (4) 
 
Where,  RSck = Risk Score due to toxic gas release within the processing plant 
  NPi = Number of people present in i facility 
  CCi = Compensation cost due to Mortality in i facility 
  RSk = Risk Score due to blast overpressure 
  FCi = Cost of ith facility building  
  RDk = Rectilinear distance of kth grid from ith facility 
  UPi = Unit piping or interconnection cost of ith facility 
  Bik = Non overlapping Constraint 
The non overlapping constraints ensure that each facility occupies a separate a single grid without overlapping 
the location of other facilities. Beside non overlapping constraint, two other constrains, namely, distance constraints 
and separation distance constraints were considered for the optimization [3]. 
3. Results and Discussions 
First, several worst case scenarios of different equipment were identified such as leakage from ammonia 
converter, catastrophic failure of primary reformer, secondary reformer, ammonia converter, and high temperature 
shift converter of ammonia plant. In each case, it was assumed the content of that particular unit released instantly. 
Table 1 shows the considered worse case scenarios for the critical units 
.Table 1: Considered process units and respective worse case scenarios. 
Process unit Worst case scenario Frequency (leak/year) 
Primary reformer Blast overpressure 2.05 x 10-3 
Secondary reformer Blast overpressure 2.28 x 10-5 
Ammonia Converter Blast overpressure& toxic release 1.14 x 10-5 
High Temp Shift Converter Blast overpressure 1.14 x 10-5 
The incident frequency of these potential outcomes were taken from standard incident frequency as actual 
accidental data of fertilizer factory were not readily available [10].The risk score for toxic gas release and for 
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catastrophic failure due to fire and explosion were determined. Since, only gaseous substances are present in the 
critical equipments the blast overpressure due to VCE was considered. 
For 1000 MTPD ammonia plant, about 3100 mol/hr of gaseous ammonia is produced in ammonia converter at 
about 440oC and 150 atm pressure. The consequence of toxic ammonia gas release from ammonia converter in each 
grid location was determined using ALOHA. A continuous release from top of the Ammonia converter was assumed 
in the simulation. The wind velocity, atmospheric temperature  and relative humidity weretaken to be 1.5 m/s, 25oC, 
and 50%, respectively, for worst case scenarios[11]. A cylindrical tank of 3m Dia and 24.5 m height which contains 
about 9000 m3 of ammonia at temperature 440oC and 140 atm pressures was considered in simulation[12]. Figure1 
shows the consequence of toxic ammonia gas release due to leakage at the top of the converter. This threat zone plot 
shows the consequences both in wind and cross wind directions.In present study, in wind direction consequence was 
used to calculate the concentrations in grids. These concentration values were subsequently converted into 
probability of death using the Probit functionand were used in calculating risk scores. 
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Fig. 2: Confidence lines for VCE in Primary Reformer, Secondary Reformer, HTS and Ammonia Converter 
The blast overpressure due to vapor cloud explosion (VCE) was considered for primary reformer (PR), secondary 
reformer (SR), ammonia converter (AC) and high temperature shift converter (HTS). The consequences of these 
units were also calculated considering the worst case scenarios. For ammonia converter, it was assumed that 
hydrogen at 439oC and 140 atm pressure is being released continuously form the top of the converter. The wind 
speed, atmospheric temperature and humidity were assumed 1.5 m/s, 25oC, and 50%, respectively. Similar 
atmospheric data were used for primary reformer, secondary reformer and HTS converter for determining the 
consequences for each grid.  Figure 2 shows the combined threat zone plots for vapor cloud explosion (VCE) for 
these for units inthe process area. The red rectangle at the center in figure 2 represents the relative size and position 
of the ammonia plant. The associated overpressure values then converted to probability of structural damage using 
probit function. Finally, using the probit function risk scores for vapor cloud explosion was calculated. 
Different facilities have different installation and interconnection/piping cost. In this work, installation and piping 
cost of the fourselected facilities of ammonia plant were approximated from literature values and industrial experts 
and presented in table 2. 
Table 2.  Installation and unit piping cost of different facilities 
Name of the facility Facility Cost ($) Unit piping/wiring 
Cost ($/m) 
Control room 120000000 1000 
Operator’s shelter-1 6,250 0 
Operator’s shelter-2 6,250 0 
Ammonia accumulator 750000 75 
 
The number of workers and operators working in ammonia plant at different locations are not distributed 
uniformly within the processing area. In today’s modern ammonia plant, most of the operators generally stay inside 
the control room. For simulation purpose, different numbers of people are assumed in different facilities.  Table 3 
shows the number of worker/operator in different facilities and the mortality compensation cost that a company has 
to pay in case of accidental injury/death.  
Table 3. Number of people and compensation liabilities for different facilities 
Name of the facility Number ofpeople working 
 in normal condition 
Compensation 
liability($) 
Control room 25 375000 
Operator’s shelter-1 5 75000 
Operator’s shelter-2 5 75000 
Ammonia accumulator 1 15000 
 
Incorporating the above the cost parameters for building, death liability and piping in total cost function, a mixed 
integer linear programming was written in AMPL which was solved using CPLEX Solver. Figure 3 shows the 
optimum layout of four different facilities (Control Room, Operator Shelter-1, Operator Shelter-2 and Ammonia 
Accumulator) within the processing area of the ammonia plant. In the optimum layout, control room was placed at 
top right corner which is due to very high capital cost and death compensation cost in case of probable accidents. 
Figure 4 compares the actual location of the facilities in KAFCO with the simulated optimum locations. In actual 
layout of KAFCO, there is a combined control and laboratory building for both ammonia and urea sections, which is 
located outside the ammonia plant. The optimum locations of Operator Shelters in present study are found at the top 
and bottom left corners of the ammonia plant. The location of one operating shelter coincides with one existing 
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shelter of KAFCO. However, the other shelter in the actual plant is found to lie in unsafe location. The location of 













A systematic approach for layout optimization of an ammonia plant is presented using risk and economic 
analysis. The positions of four important facilities of ammonia plant were optimized with respect to four critical 
process units using optimization of risk score, capital cost and separation distance constraints. Risk mapping for 
each grid was evaluated using ALOHA for toxic release and fire explosion scenarios. Although, only four different 
facilities were considered in this study, this methodology can be extended further for all other units of the ammonia 
plant.  
This work is based on the methodology proposed by Jung et al [3]. Jung et al., however, used their methodology 
for single release and single facility optimization. This is one of the first attempts to apply this method to simulate 
real plant scenario. This work has also been an important exercise in identifying major risk factors in an ammonia 
plant and understanding the importance of incorporating safety during design stage as well as during operation. 
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Fig. 4: Comparison of optimum facility layout with the existing layout of 
KAFCOammonia plant (red circles represent optimum layout) 
Fig. 3: Optimum layout of the four facilities within 
ammonia plant 
